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Oei and Kools de Visser v. Citibank, N.A.: Southern District of
New York finds letter of credit applicant has no implied time
limit to bring wrongful honor claim
A commercial letter of credit serves to facilitate a contract
for the sale of goods between a buyer and seller.' In an interna-
tional setting, without a guaranteed payment device, the seller
runs the risk of shipping its goods and not receiving payment,
and the buyer bears the risk of paying for, yet never receiving,
the goods.2 A letter of credit alleviates this risk by obtaining a
commitment from a third party to make the payment.3 By per-
mitting the seller to rely on the credit of the issuing bank, a let-
ter of credit provides a convenient, economical, and predictable
means of financing a transaction for a seller who is wary of rely-
ing on the buyer's credit.4 These inherent benefits have made
1 See JOHN F. DOLAN, THE LAW OF LETTERS OF CREDIT 1.01 (rev. ed. 1996)
[hereinafter DOLAN LETTERS]; see also Alaska Textile Co., Inc. v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 982 F.2d 813, 815 (2d Cir. 1992) (defining commercial letter of credit as "a
common payment mechanism in international trade that permits the buyer in a
transaction to substitute the financial integrity of a stable credit source (usually a
bank) for his own"); Rufus James Trimble, The Law Merchant and the Letter of
Credit, 61 HARV. L. REV. 981, 1004-05 (1948) (detailing various letter of credit
agreements). For descriptions of variations on the letter of credit, such as the
standby letter of credit and direct pay letter of credit, see DOLAN LETTERS, supra,
1.04, at 16 (distinguishing commercial letter of credit from standby letter of credit,
which serves to reduce risk of nonpayment under contract that calls for perform-
ance). Distinct from a surety bond, the standby letter of credit acts almost as a
surety, "payable upon certification of a party's nonperformance." Id.; see also Peter
H. Wel, Letters of Credit, 754 PRAC. L. INST. COM. 511, 519-22 (1997)
(distinguishing commercial letter of credit from standby letter of credit which is not
expected to be paid, and is normally payable only upon proof that party did not per-
form). Furthermore, letters of credit are technically not collateral for the obligations
of the buyer. See id. at 514. Direct pay letters of credit are derivatives, expected to
be drawn upon at completion of an obligation, and are valued because they shift the
risk of bankruptcy or nonperformance from the beneficiary to the issuer. See id. at
522. Commercial letters of credit are the most common type of letter of credit. See
id. at 519.
2 See DOLAN LETTERS, supra note 1, 1.01[1], at 3.
' See Weil, supra note 1, at 513; see also First Commercial Bank v. Gotham
Originals, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 287, 293, 475 N.E.2d 1255, 1258, 486 N.Y.S.2d 715, 718
(1985).
4 See First Commercial Bank, 64 N.Y.2d at 297-98, 475 N.E.2d at 1261, 486
N.Y.S.2d at 721. The advantages of speed, low cost, and certainty are remarkable in
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the letter of credit a preferred instrument for facilitating com-
merce since its inception nearly 3000 years ago.5 Evolving
through the English common law, the rules governing letters of
credit have since found their way into American jurisprudence
where they flourish today.6
The Southern District of New York recently reaffirmed the
traditional principles that control letter of credit law in Oei and
Kools de Visser v. Citibank, N.A.7 The court rendered a decision,
however, that will change the way banks must draft their letter
of credit application agreements.8 In reaching its decision, the
court stated that there is no implied time limit imposed upon a
letter of credit applicant to notify the issuing bank of any dis-
crepancies in the documents presented by the beneficiary of the
letter of credit.9 Therefore, banks must include an express time
limit in the letter of credit application agreement in order to set
a reasonable time beyond which the applicant can no longer
challenge the bank's acceptance of the documents presented and
subsequent payment of the letter of credit. ° This decision cre-
ated a new precedent in New York letter of credit law.
In its classic form, the letter of credit arrangement consists
of three wholly independent contracts between parties to a com-
view of the often complex transactions that the letter of credit serves, and in view of
the availability of rival commercial devices, such as performance bonds, escrows,
and other surety arrangements that are relatively more expensive and slow in crea-
tion and performance. See John F. Dolan, Letter of Credit Disputes Between the Is-
suer and its Customer: The Issuers Rights Under the Misnamed "Bifurcated Stan-
dard," 105 BANKING L.J. 380, 385 (1988) [hereinafter Dolan Disputes].
5 See Trimble, supra note 1, at 984. It is believed that the Phoenician merchants
used letters of credit in extending their commerce to cities in the Mediterranean.
See id. The merchant bankers of Venice, Genoa, Florence, and other commercial
cities of Europe freely used letters of credit in the fourteenth century. See id. at 984-
85.
, See Voest-Alpine Intl Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 707 F.2d 680, 682 (2d
Cir. 1983). Commercial letters of credit are a mercantile specialty entirely separate
from other common law concepts and they must be viewed as entities unto them-
selves. See id. In addition, over 140 countries follow the International Chamber of
Commerce's Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits [hereinafter
U.C.P.], which is a restatement-like guideline covering letter of credit law. See
Alaska Textile Co., 982 F.2d at 816 n.1. In many foreign countries, letters of credit
were needed by manufacturers to ensure compliance with quota restrictions on ex-
ports. See Indu Craft Inc. v. Bank of Baroda, 47 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 1995). See gener-
ally Trimble, supra note 1, at 990-92.
7 957 F. Supp. 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
8 See id. at 514.
9 See id.
'0 See id.
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mercial transaction: (1) the underlying contract for the purchase
and sale of goods between a seller, who is the beneficiary under
the letter of credit, and the buyer; (2) the contract containing the
application and instructions for payment between the issuer,
typically a bank, and the buyer, or applicant; and (3) the letter of
credit itself, which is the payment mechanism for the seller-
beneficiary." In order for the beneficiary of the letter of credit to
receive payment, or draw on the letter of credit, the beneficiary
must present to the issuing bank certain documents that are re-
quired in the letter of credit agreement. 12 Such proof typically
consists of a draft or demand for payment, bills of lading, docu-
ments of title, certificates of origin and inspection, transport and
insurance certificates, and commercial invoices. 3 This documen-
tary proof must strictly conform to the terms of the letter of
credit. 4 If the beneficiary presents the complying documents
" See Alaska Textile Co., 982 F.2d at 815; see also N.Y. U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(d)
(McKinney 1996) (defining "beneficiary"); N.Y. U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(c) (defining
"issuer"); N.Y. U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(g) (defining "customer"). See generally BROOKE
WUNNICKE, DIANE B. WUNNICKE, & PAUL S. TURNER, STANDBY AND COMMERCIAL
LETTERS OF CREDIT § 2.6 (2d ed. 1996) (describing underlying transaction as sale of
goods from beneficiary to applicant, and explaining that rights and obligations of
parties are governed by their agreement). In the second agreement, the issuing
bank agrees to issue the letter of credit to the beneficiary in return for the appli-
cant's promise to pay for the letter of credit and reimburse the issuer when the let-
ter is honored. See id. The third agreement is the letter of credit, where the issuer
undertakes to honor the beneficiary's presentation of the documents specified in the
credit. See id.; see also Kenneth Block & Jeffrey Steiner, Letters of Credit: Documen-
tary Compliance with Security Device is Essential, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 17, 1997, at 5.
,2 See Block & Steiner, supra note 11, at 5.
13 See DOLAN LETTERS, supra note 1, 91 1.07[1], at 38-42; see also Alaska Textile
Co., 982 F.2d at 815.
" See Edmondston v. Drake, 30 U.S. 624, 637 (1831) (requiring "exactness and
precision which peculiarly distinguish commercial transactions, which is an impor-
tant principle in the law and usage of merchants ...") ; Equitable Trust v. Dawson
Partners, Ltd., 27 Lloyd's List Law Rep. 49, 52 (H.L. 1927) (setting forth criterion:
"There is no room for documents which are almost the same, or which will do just as
well"). New York courts have traditionally required strict compliance with the terms
of letters of credit. See Corporation De Mercadeo Agricola v. Mellon Bank Int'l, 608
F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 1979) (agreeing with District Court that it was "black letter law
that the terms and conditions of a letter of credit must be strictly adhered to")
(citations omitted); North Am. Foreign Trading Corp. v. Chiao Tung Bank, 1997 WL
193197, at *8 (S.D.N.Y.); Sunlight Distrib., Inc. v. Bank of Communications, 1995
WL 46636, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.) (following Equitable Trust and stating "[wihile some
courts have adopted the less stringent 'substantial compliance' test, 'strict compli-
ance' remains the rule in this Circuit") (citations omitted); United Commodities-
Greece v. Fidelity Int'l Bank, 64 N.Y.2d 449, 455, 478 N.E.2d 172, 174, 489 N.Y.S.2d
31, 33 (1985) (justifying New York's strict compliance with terms of letter of credit,
rather than more relaxed standard of substantial compliance, because bank's role in
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under the letter of credit in a timely fashion, the issuer must
pay.
15
The independent nature of the three contracts between the
parties is known as the "'independence principle.""'6 The inde-
pendence principle requires the bank to ignore the underlying
contract between the buyer and seller.17 Any attempt by the is-
transaction is ministerial and does not involve determining substantiality of dis-
crepancies); Fair Pavilions Inc. v. First-Nat'l City Bank, 19 N.Y.2d 512, 227 N.E.2d
839, 281 N.Y.S.2d 23, 25 (1967); DOLAN LETTERS, supra note 1, 1.07, at 1-38
(stating "[i]t is a well-established principle of letter of credit law that the description
of the goods in a commercial invoice must mirror the description in the credit it-
self'); see also Western Int'l Forest Prods., Inc. v. Shinhan Bank, 860 F. Supp. 151,
154 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that facsimile copy of inspection certificate stamped
"original" did not conform to strict compliance rule that requires original document);
Trifinery v. Banque Paribas, 762 F. Supp. 1119, 1122 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding non-
compliance where original invoice did not conform to letter of credit requirement for
copy). But see National Bank of N. Am. v. Alizio, 103 A.D.2d 690, 691-92, 477
N.Y.S.2d 356, 357-58 (1st Dep't 1984) (stating that bank paying note on written
"Advice of Payment" rather than "draft[ ]," absent any prejudice to parties, was
merely matter of "technical niceties" and parties could not avoid obligations), affd,
65 N.Y.2d 788, 482 N.E.2d 907, 493 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1995); Bank of N.Y. & Trust Co.
v. Atterbury Bros., Inc., 226 App. Div. 117, 119-20, 234 N.Y.S. 442, 449 (1st Dep't
1929) (holding that flaws such as name "A. James Brown" being written as "Arthur
James Brown" were "trivial" and did not have "slightest causal relationship" to
damage), affd, 253 N.Y. 569, 171 N.E. 786 (1930); REV. U.C.C. § 5-108 (explaining
that strict compliance does not demand oppressive perfectionism, so that draft of
"Letter of Credit No. 86-122-5" could be paid by "Letter of Credit No. 86-122-S" or
where document addressed by foreign person to General Motors was written as
"Jeneral Motors").
15 See N.Y. U.C.C. § 5-114(1) (defining issuer's duty and privilege to honor de-
mand for payments regardless of whether goods or documents conform to underly-
ing contract between buyer and seller); U.C.P. art. 14 (requiring that honoring
documents appear on their face to be in compliance with terms and conditions of
credit); REV. U.C.C. § 5-108(a) (defining issuer's rights and obligations regarding
payment).
16 Oei and Kools de Visser v. Citibank, N.A., 957 F. Supp. 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
17 See N.Y. U.C.C. § 5-109(1)(a) (defining issuer's obligation to its customer as
not including liability or responsibility for performance of underlying contract); see
also Voest-Alpine Int'l. Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 707 F.2d 680, 682-83 (2d
Cir. 1983) (explaining benefits of independence principle since banks, dealing only in
documents, will be able to act quickly, enhancing letter of credit's fluidity); Optopics
Lab. Corp. v. Savannah Bank of Nigeria, Ltd., 816 F. Supp. 898, 908 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(explaining independence principle and further explaining that each contract is
"subject only to the terms bargained for by the parties to that particular contract");
First Commercial Bank v. Gotham Originals, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 287, 294, 475 N.E.2d
1255, 1259, 486 N.Y.S.2d 715, 719 (1985) (restating fundamental principle that
bank's obligation to honor drafts drawn on letter of credit is separate and independ-
ent from applicant's obligation to beneficiary); United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge
Sporting Goods Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 254, 259, 360 N.E.2d 943, 948, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265,
270 (1976) (stating that "[blanks issuing letters of credit deal in documents and not
in goods and are not responsible for any breach of warranty or nonconformity of the
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suer to avoid payment premised on extrinsic considerations, such
as a default in the underlying contract of sale, compromises the
letter of credit's chief virtue as a predictable and reliable pay-
ment mechanism. 8 "Similarly, independence relieves the issuing
bank of the burden of determining the performance required in
the underlying contract. The issuing bank need only look at the
letter of credit and the documents on their face." 9 However, in-
dependent transactions also require that the issuer meticulously
comply with the terms of the letter of credit to ensure its reim-
bursement by the applicant."0 Because the issuing bank sits in a
better position to determine whether the presented documents
conform to the letter of credit requirements, if it overlooks or ig-
goods involved in the underlying sales contract") (citations omitted); CE Casecnan
Water & Energy Co. v. Korea First Bank, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 28, 1997, at 22, col. 4 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1997) (explaining that duties of bank do not extend beyond bank's
contracts); Sztejn v. Schroder Banking Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 721-23, 31 N.Y.S.2d
631, 634-35 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1941) (explaining that independence principle is
necessary to preserve efficiency of letter of credit as instrument for financing of
trade). But see First Commercial Bank, 64 N.Y.2d at 295, 475 N.E.2d at 1259, 486
N.Y.S.2d at 719 (stating that issuer must pay draft on letter of credit to holder in
due course); United Bank Ltd., 41 N.Y.2d at 261, 360 N.E.2d at 949, 392 N.Y.S.2d at
271 (stating if intermediary bank was not holder in due course, it could be denied
from recovering proceeds of draft on letter of credit); Maurice O'Meara Co. v. Na-
tional Park Bank of N.Y., 239 N.Y. 386, 402, 146 N.E. 636, 641 (1925) (Cardozo, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing majority for applying independence principle to shipment of
bulk paper: "If that is so, the bales tendered might have been rags instead of paper,
and still the bank would have been helpless, though it had knowledge of the truth, if
the documents tendered by the seller were sufficient on their face"); Andina Coffee,
Inc. v. National Westminster Bank, 160 A.D.2d 104, 110, 560 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5 (1st
Dep't 1990) (finding negotiating bank's "apparently active role" in coercing revisions
of documents fell short of holder in due course status); Sztejn, 177 Misc. at 722-23,
31 N.Y.S.2d at 634 (carving out exception to independence principle, allowing for
judicial injunction against payment where issuer has knowledge of seller's fraud be-
fore documents are presented for payment). This exception to the independence
principle has been recognized by the U.C.C. See N.Y. U.C.C. § 5-114(2) (allowing
discretionary exception where holder of note is not holder in due course despite al-
legations of fraud).
' See Voest-Alpine Int'l Corp., 707 F.2d at 682. 'For the document examiner to
stray from the face of the documents and delve into the underlying transaction will
take more time and result in more expense than the letter of credit can sustain."
Dolan Disputes, supra note 4, at 415. After payment under the credit, inquiry be-
yond the face of the documents does not burden the credit as a commercial device.
See id. Likewise, the independence principle compels the bank to pay on the letter of
credit, even if it failed to secure proper collateral from the buyer or accidentally
agreed to overpay. See Mennen v. J.P. Morgan & Co., 229 A.D.2d 237, 653 N.Y.S.2d
1010 (4th Dep't 1997) (refusing to reallocate risks assumed by parties when entering
into contract by precluding recovery to bank for overpayments).
"Block & Steiner, supra note 11, at 5.
20 See Voest-Alpine Int'l Corp., 707 F.2d at 682-83.
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nores flaws in the paperwork, absent a waiver by the buyer, the
21bank may be liable to the buyer for wrongful honor.
Wrongful honor cases involve disputes between the issuer
and the applicant after the beneficiary has drawn on the letter of
credit.22 These cases, however, are uncommon' and thus provide
scattered precedent and little guidance with respect to several
letter of credit nuances.24 One unsettled issue involved whether
the length of time an applicant had to bring a wrongful honor
action against an issuer was controlled by the applicable statute
of limitations or could be reduced by waiver. In Oei and Kools de
Visser v. Citibank, N.A. ,25 the Southern District of New York in-
terpreted New York law to reject implied time limits for appli-
cants to bring flawed documents to the bank's attention.26 As a
result, the court set new precedent that will require banks to
draft letters of credit with time limits that require applicants to
promptly question any defects in the documentary proof pre-
sented by beneficiaries.
In Oei, plaintiff Kools de Visser ("Kools"), engaged in the
wholesale and retail selling of clothing in the Netherlands. 27 The
company hired Rudy Oei ("Oei") as a broker to purchase Levi
21 See Oei, 957 F. Supp. at 513-14. The court reasoned that the inspection of the
seller's documents is solely the bank's task because: (1) the bank is the party paid to
undertake the duty of scrutinizing documents; (2) the bank has expertise in such
matters; (3) it is familiar with banking usage, the U.C.P., and the proper format of
shipping documents; and (4) the buyer need not have any familiarity in such mat-
ters in order to conduct its business, since '[o]ne who deals in widgets may be pre-
sumed to be familiar with widgets or the market in widgets, not necessarily with the
documents that underlie a shipment of widgets or the U.C.P." Id.
22 See James G. Barnes & James E. Byrne, Survey, Letters of Credit: 1995
Cases, 51 BUS. LAW. 1417, 1417-18 (Aug. 1996) (categorizing commercial letters
generally into wrongful dishonor and wrongful honor, or post-honor, cases). Wrong-
ful dishonor cases involve pre-honor disputes between the beneficiary and the issuer
to compel honor or between the applicant and the issuer to prevent honor. See id. at
1418.
23 See id. at 1428 (finding only one reported case of wrongful honor in United
States in 1995).
24 See Oei, 957 F. Supp. at 503-04 (noting disagreement as to whether standard
for compliance in buyer-bank contract was strict compliance or substantial compli-
ance). The court stated that there was no well-developed and authoritative body of
law governing an applicant's duty to inspect and return documents of title, and sub-
sequently found that no such duty existed. See id. at 511; see also Barnes & Byrne,
supra note 22, at 1425-26 (considering defenses to payment).
2 957 F. Supp. 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
24 See id. at 511-12.
27 Id. at 498.
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jeans in the United States.2 Oei arranged a transaction with
21Jade-USA ("Jade"), a purported Florida supplier of such jeans.
To effect this transaction, Kools transferred the necessary funds
to Oei, which he used to apply for a letter of credit from Citi-
bank, N.A. ("Citibank"). 30 The letter of credit agreement pro-
vided that the letter of credit would be governed by the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce's Uniform Customs and Practice
for Documentary Credits ("U.C.P."),"1 with any gaps filled by.
New York law.
32
On three separate occasions during November, 1992, Jade
presented documents to Citibank and requested payment for
goods shipped under the letter of credit. 3 Citibank notified Jade
on two occasions that its documents were not in compliance and
would not be accepted.' Citibank, however, accepted the third
set of documents and paid Jade in full on December 2, 1992.3'
2" See id.
See id.
3 See id. The two defendants in the case were Citibank, N.A. and Citibank In-
ternational, a Citibank, N.A. affiliate located in Miami which acted as an advising
bank to Citibank, N.A. See id. Some of the roles between the two affiliates were dis-
puted in the action. See id. For the purposes of this Recent Development, the two
are referred to collectively as "Citibank."
31 See id. The parties used the 1983 version of the U.C.P. See id.; see also Bouzo
v. Citibank, N.A., 96 F.3d 51, 57 n.3 (2d Cir. 1996) (explaining that "[tihe U.C.P. is a
compilation of internationally accepted commercial practices that is often incorpo-
rated into parties' private contracts") (citations omitted).
.2 See Oei, 957 F. Supp. at 498. Article 5 of New York's U.C.C. provides that the
parties to a letter of credit agreement may opt for either the U.C.P. or the U.C.C. to
govern. See N.Y. U.C.C. § 5-102(4) (allowing parties to exclude U.C.C. from transac-
tion). "Unless otherwise agreed, this Article 5 does not apply to a letter of credit or a
credit if by its terms or by agreement ... such letter of credit ... is subject in whole or
in part to the Uniform Customs and Practice for Commercial Documentary Credits
.... "/Id
See Oei, 957 F. Supp. at 499. The funds represented by the letter of credit
would be made available to Jade once it presented a sight draft, the invoice, an in-
surance policy, a packing list, a bill of lading, and a certificate of compliance of
quality and inspection by Lloyds of London to Citibank. See id.
See id. The documents presented by the Florida seller did not conform to the
letter of credit requirements. For instance, the seller presented a truck bill of lad-
ing, rather than a marine bill of lading, purporting to show shipment by truck from
Seattle, Washington to the Netherlands. See id. The same bill of lading, received by
Citibank five days predated, failed to identify the goods, and it named Jade, rather
than Kools, as consignor. See id. The second "original" bill of lading came from a
marine company, rather than a trucking company, but again contained discrepan-
cies. See id. Citibank reported that Jade would" T& " the problem. See id.
5 See id. at 500. The third set of "original" shipping documents Citibank col-
lected contained discrepancies such as: (1) incorrectly describing the goods in the
invoice as "Levi JEANS 501 0191 NEW ORLEANS, MADE IN USA LABELS" in-
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Oei received the documents from Citibank the same day and
found discrepancies.36 For the next several days, the plaintiffs
tried to get an explanation of the discrepancies from Jade." On
December 11, 1997, Kools notified Jade that it was terminating
its attempted purchase.38 The goods, which turned out to be
counterfeit, never arrived at Kools."9 By January 30, 1993, Kools
had "unequivocally" demanded a refund from Jade, but never re-
ceived one.4 ° Kools then commenced an action against Citibank.41
The court addressed several issues, including whether there was
a time limit on the liability of the issuer after it had honored a
letter of credit.42
The court in Oei refused to reduce the statutory time limit
on the bank's liability after it accepted nonconforming docu-
ments.43 New York courts have traditionally followed the settled
rule that documents presented to the bank must, on their face,
strictly comply with the terms of the letter of credit." A bank
stead of" LEVI JEANS 501-0191, NEW, ORIGINALS, MADE IN USA LABELS'";
(2) a party other than Lloyds of London had done the inspection; and (3) major dif-
ferences in weight, quantity; and date shipped. See id. at 499-500, 508.
16 See id. at 500.
17 See id. at 500-01.
38 See id. at 501.
'9 See id. "The parties dispute the fate of the goods." Id. Defendants claim that
the jeans arrived in the Netherlands and were seized as counterfeit by Dutch cus-
toms. See id. Plaintiffs claim the confiscated jeans were not intended for them, and
that their shipment was never sent. See id.
40 Id. at 501. In a settlement agreement from an earlier action, Jade signed a
promissory note which it later failed to repay. See id. Kools subsequently obtained a
judgmnent against Jade that remains unsatisfied. See id.
See id. at 497. Kools de Visser filed this action with Oei after unsuccessfully
pursuing Citibank on its own. See Kools v. Citibank, 872 F. Supp. 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(dismissing Kools' wrongful honor action for lack of standing as undisclosed princi-
pal); see also Kools v. Citibank, 73 F.3d 5 (2d Cir. 1995) (certifying question to New
York Court of Appeals); M.J.F.M. Kools v. Citibank, NA, 87 N.Y.2d 937, 664 N.E.2d
507, 641 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1996) (accepting question); cf Kools v. Citibank, 1996 WL
450776 (2d Cir. 1996) (withdrawing question).
42 See Oei, 957 F. Supp. at 511-16.
43 Id. at 512 (stating that there is nothing in U.C.P. permitting automatic
waiver because of applicant's failure to object promptly to discrepancies, and that
New York does not impose duty on applicants to object promptly). Presumably, the
statute of limitations for breach of contract would apply. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213
(McKinney 1996) (providing for six-year limit, unless contract is for sale of goods, in
which case U.C.C. § 2-725 applies and limit is four years, N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-725
(McKinney 1981)). The sales contract statute of limitations would not be applicable
because the application agreement is an entirely separate and independent contract
from the underlying contract for the sale of goods between the buyer and the seller.
See supra note 17 (discussing independence principle).
" See supra note 14 (discussing strict compliance with terms of letter of credit).
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has a duty, independent from the underlying contract, to ensure
that the documents presented conform to the specifications con-
tained in the letter of credit, forcing the bank to carefully scru-
tinize the documents for compliance.45 Consequently, Citibank's
failure to strictly comply with the letter of credit requirements,
and its subsequent acceptance of the nonconforming documents,
constituted a breach." Before the decision in Oei, however, it
remained unclear how long the bank remained liable for subse-
quently found discrepancies in the documents.
Citibank argued that by failing to object promptly to facial
discrepancies in Jade's documents, and by failing to return those
documents to Citibank, Oei and Kools waived their right to sue
for breach of the application agreement.47 Citibank asserted that
Oei and Kools had a duty to notify the bank that the documents
did not conform to the letter of credit requirements and a further
duty to return the documents within a reasonable time.4" Citi-
bank claimed that since U.C.P. Article 16 requires the issuing
bank to notify the beneficiary of acceptance or rejection of docu-
ments within a reasonable time, the applicant should have a
similar duty to notify the issuer within a reasonable time of any
"' See Voest-Alpine Int'l Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 707 F.2d 680, 682-83
(2d Cir. 1983).
"6 See supra note 17 (discussing independence principle); see also Dolan Dis-
putes, supra note 4, at 384 (comparing strict compliance with " 'bifurcated stan-
dard!" which requires strict compliance in beneficiary-bank relationship, but only
substantial compliance in applicant-bank relationship and proposing variation of
bifurcated standard that should be used). To prevent confusion, practitioners and
courts must distinguish beneficiary claims from applicant claims. See id. Professor
Dolan is in agreement with the majority of courts when he states that courts should
"consider the consequences, in the customer context, of the issuers payment over
documentary defects." Id. When this is done, the courts are imposing a substantial
compliance rule on the applicant-bank relationship. See id. However, Professor Do-
lan believes that the idea of a bifurcated standard is misleading. See id. at 415. He
asserts that there should be a strict compliance standard with respect to the bene-
ficiary-bank relationship. See id. With respect to the applicant-bank relationship, he
states that the documents should be examined to determine the damages that result
from the defects and payment by the applicant should be adjusted accordingly. See
id. In Oei, Judge Mukasey recognized that there were differences over which stan-
dard should be applied, but ruled that Citibank failed under either standard. Oei,
957 F. Supp. at 503-04.
47 See id. at 511.
48 See id.; see also Dominic Bencivenga, Letters of Credit: Pacts Redrafted After
Judge Attacks Bank's Role, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 17, 1997, at 5 (discussing various options
that banks have to require timely notice of document discrepancies by applicant
when drafting letter of credit).
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nonconformity in the documents presented." Citibank further
argued that failure to comply would result "in a waiver of dis-
crepancies that 'operates as a matter of law.'"50
Two recent U.S. District Court decisions have provided for
time limits on the liability of banks for wrongful honor due to
document discrepancies.5 In Petra International Banking Corp.
v. First American Bank of Virginia,52 the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia found an automatic waiver of discrepancies after a benefi-
ciary's confirming bank waited one year before claiming that the
documents did not conform to the letter of credit requirements."
In Linkers (Far East) PTE., Ltd. v. International Polymers, Inc.,"
the Southern District of New York dismissed a claim by a buyer
against a confirming bank that had accepted nonconforming
documents.55 In Linkers, the plaintiff-buyer received a shipment
of "worthless scrap" instead of the product it had ordered.56
However, the plaintiff failed to report any documentary discrep-
ancies for several months, and then brought suit against the
'9 See U.C.P. art. 16 (stating that if issuing bank desires to refuse documents, it
must do so "without delay"). "If the Issuing Bank and/or Confirming Bank, if any,
fails to act in accordance with the provisions of this Article, ... [that bank] shall be
precluded from claiming that the documents are not in compliance with the terms
and conditions of the Credit." U.C.P. art. 16(e).
Oei, 957 F. Supp. at 511 (quoting Def. 12/4/96 Mem. at 13). District Judge
Mukasey wrote "[w]aiver in this [ I sense is more properly termed 'forfeiture.'" Id.
at n.5 (quoting Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239,
243 (2d Cir. 1996). An issuing bank can receive permission, in the form of an implied
or express waiver, to accept documents with discrepancies between the letter of
credit requirements and what is actually received from the beneficiary. See id. at
509-15.
5' See Linkers (Far East) PTE., Ltd. v. International Polymers, 1996 WL 412854
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); Petra Intl Banking Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1120 (E.D. Va. 1991), affd,
953 F.2d 1383 (4th Cir. 1992); see also N.Y. U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(f) (defining a
"'confirming bank'" as "a bank which engages either that it will itself honor a
[letter of] credit already issued by another bank or that such a credit will be honored
by the issuer or a third bank").
5 758 F. Supp. 1120 (E.D. Va. 1991).
See id. at 1128. In resolving the issue of whether a year was too long a delay,
the court held against the buyer and the issuing bank, reasoning that because the
buyer took possession of the goods using the nonconforming documents, and had al-
ready settled with the seller, the buyer had delayed for more than a reasonable
amount of time, and the trivial defects did not contribute to the fraud. See id. at
1136.
' 1996 WL 412854 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
5 See id. at *1. The discrepancies that existed between the letter of credit and
the documents submitted by the beneficiary were "de minimus," and would not have
alerted the issuing bank to the beneficiarys fraud. Id.
56 Id. at *1-2.
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confirming bank. 7 The Linkers court determined that the non-
compliance claim was precluded because of a U.C.P. provision
defining the issuing bank's duty to provide timely notice of dis-
crepancies to the beneficiary." However, the court said nothing
with regard to the duty an applicant owes to the issuing or con-
firming bank.59 The Oei court distinguished Petra and Linkers
not only on their facts, but on the law of letters of credit. 0
In its analysis, the Oei court correctly treated each of the
three transactions as separate and independent.61  The U.C.P.
and New York law governed the contract between Citibank and
Oei.62 The U.C.P. provision followed in Linkers imposed time
limits for notification of document discrepancies on the benefici-
5 See id.
s Id. at *1. See Oei, 957 F. Supp. at 512 (finding no New York statutory law im-
posing duty on applicant to object promptly). The Oei court also found no New York
case law creating a per se rule barring an applicant's cause of action for wrongful
dishonor for not returning the documents to the issuing bank promptly. Id. at 512-
13. The court barred the claim against the confirming bank because the issuer failed
to object promptly to the confirming bank. See id.; see also supra note 49 (discussing
U.C.P. provisions). Similarly, in Habib Bank, Ltd. v. Convermat Corp., 145 Misc. 2d
980, 982, 554 N.Y.S.2d 757, 758 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1990), an issuing bank that
failed to refuse nonconforming documents was precluded, under Article 16 of the
U.C.P., from claiming that the documents were not in accordance with the terms of
the letter of credit after a one month delay. See Bank of Cochin, Ltd. v. Manufactur-
ers Hanover Trust Co., 808 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding waiver after delay of 12
to 13 days).
'9 See Oei, 957 F. Supp. at 512.
c See id. at 512-13 (factually distinguishing those cases because plaintiffs in
those cases were banks confirming credits for beneficiaries rather than applicant).
Distinguishing the Linkers holding, the court stated that "there is no support in the
U.C.P. 400 for an automatic waiver or preclusion arising from the applicant's failure
to object promptly to discrepancies" and "[tihe [clourt said nothing of an applicant's
duty to an issuer." Id. at 512 (emphasis added). Next, the court distinguished the
instant case from Petra because in that case, the discrepancies there were trivial,
plaintiffs waited one year before objecting, and plaintiffs actually received the
goods. See id. at 515.
6'1 Id. at 508.
6 See id. at 498; see also supra note 32 (noting New York's version of Article 5
gives parties option of governing their contract by Uniform Commercial Code
[hereinafter "U.C.C."] or by the U.C.P.). Revised Article 5 of the U.C.C. allows for a
letter of credit to be governed by the U.C.P., even when it conflicts with the U.C.C.,
except where the provisions of the U.C.C. are set forth as nonvariable, in which case
revised U.C.C. Article 5 will govern. See REV. U.C.C. § 5-108; see also Wel, supra
note 1, at 516-17 (commenting that American Law Institute and National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws revised Article 5 in 1995, and that as
of October 1, 1997, revised Article 5 has been enacted in 14 states plus District of
Columbia).
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ary-bank contract,' but no direct provision regarding a time
limit on the applicant-issuer contract existed.6 Because the in-
dependence principle required separate analysis of each contract,
New York case law governed the interpretation of the application
agreement between Citibank and Oei."5 Furthermore, since the
issuer is charged with inspecting the documents, "absence of an
automatic waiver rule does not prejudice the issuer."66 Stating
that the governing contract law does not impose a duty on the
applicant to "inspect the documents promptly, report discrepan-
cies and return the documents," the court held that "an applicant
does not, by operation of law, waive its right to sue for breach of
the application ... by failing to object promptly and to return the
documents to the issuer."67
The court's holding in Oei has two effects: (1) an applicant's
wrongful honor claim is not subject to an implied time limit, and
(2) inaction by the applicant does not amount to an automatic
waiver of the strict compliance requirement.'
Issuing banks that routinely honor multi-million dollar let-
ters of credit could find this decision troublesome, unless they
revise their application contracts accordingly. The best solution
for banks is to ensure strict compliance with essential terms of
the letter of credit, thus eliminating any potential future liability
to the applicant. In addition, it would be advisable to write an
express time limit into the contract, after which the applicant is
"See supra note 49.
"See Oei, 957 F. Supp at 512 ("[The U.C.P.] imposes no obligation on the appli-
cant and concerns only the issuer's obligations to the beneficiary.").
See id. at 502-03 (discussing possible sources of controlling law). The court
further stated that although the official comment to U.C.C. § 5-113(2) seems to im-
ply that an applicant has ten days to object to documents, the application agreement
provided that the U.C.P. governed, rendering the U.C.C. inapplicable. See id. at 512.
This same principle was also stated quite clearly in Optopics Laboratories Corp., 816
F. Supp. at 902. In that case, the court distinguished the contracts between the
parties by applying the independence principle and held against the issuer who
claimed that since Nigerian law covered the application contract, it should also
cover the other contracts. See id. However, the court held that the choice of law for
the application contract had "no impact at all" on the bank-beneficiary contract. See
id. at 902. Furthermore, New York case law had not created a per se rule barring an
applicant from objecting to an issuer's honor of a letter of credit if such objection
was not made promptly. See Oei, 957 F. Supp. at 512. Cases cited by Citibank were
distinguishable from the instant case in that the discrepancies were trivial and were
unrelated to any loss. See id. at 512-13.
6 Id. at 514
67 Id. at 511.
'8 Id. at 515.
892 [Vol.71:881
19971 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK LAW 893
estopped from recovering from the bank. This will protect the
issuing bank from possible exposure to losses incurred when an
applicant resurfaces months later, raising previously unnoticed
discrepancies in the documents presented by the beneficiary. A
time limit further places the applicant on notice that he or she
must make a timely examination of the documents on his or her
own, since the bank's liability will cease after a certain period,
leaving the applicant-buyer with only warranty claims against
the seller. This approach will ensure the continued widespread
use of letters of credit as reliable payment mechanisms.
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